Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: theory and evidence by Cahuc, Pierre et al.
Econometrica, Vol. 74, No. 2 (March, 2006), 323-364 
WAGE BARGAINING WITH ON-THE-JOB SEARCH: 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
BY PIERRE CAHUC, FABIEN POSTEL-VINAY, AND JEAN-MARC ROBIN' 
Most applications of Nash bargaining over wages ignore between-employer compe- 
tition for labor services and attribute all of the workers' rent to their bargaining power. 
In this paper, we write and estimate an equilibrium model with strategic wage bargain- 
ing and on-the-job search and use it to take another look at the determinants of wages 
in France. There are three essential determinants of wages in our model: productiv- 
ity, competition between employers resulting from on-the-job search, and the workers' 
bargaining power. We find that between-firm competition matters a lot in the determi- 
nation of wages, because it is quantitatively more important than wage bargaining a la 
Nash in raising wages above the workers' "reservation wages," defined as out-of-work 
income. In particular, we detect no significant bargaining power for intermediate- and 
low-skilled workers, and a modestly positive bargaining power for high-skilled workers. 
KEYWORDS: earch frictions, structural estimation, wage bargaining, labor market 
competition. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
WHEN BETWEEN-EMPLOYER COMPETITION for labor services is not perfect, 
firm-worker matches are associated with a positive rent, defined as the ex- 
pected value of future match output flows net of the worker's and firm's outside 
options. Understanding how these rents are shared between workers and em- 
ployers necessitates a complete characterization of the determinants of those 
outside options. Labor market competition is crucial in this respect: even in an 
imperfectly competitive labor market, it is in the workers' interest to prompt 
interfirm competition through on-the-job search. However, the existing liter- 
ature on labor market rent-sharing generally understates the role of interfirm 
competition for two main reasons. First, the vast majority of contributions to 
this literature ignore on-the-job search altogether. Second, in cases where on- 
the-job search is permitted, incumbent employers are not allowed to counter 
outside offers. 
In this paper, we propose an equilibrium model with strategic wage bargain- 
ing, on-the-job search, and counteroffers. The model builds on Postel-Vinay 
and Robin (2002), which is a competitive model with search frictions. In the 
'Conversations with Manuel Arellano, Bruno Cr6pon, Zvi Eckstein, Francis Kramarz, Guy 
Laroque, Thierry Magnac, Dale Mortensen, Barbara Petrongolo, Chris Pissarides, and Randy 
Wright were helpful for the preparation of this paper. The authors also wish to thank three 
anonymous referees, the editor, and participants in the following conferences and workshops: 
the CEPR DAEUP meeting in Paris (May 2002), the CEPR/IZA ESSLE meeting in Buch an 
Amersee (Sept. 2002), the ERC conference in Chicago (Oct. 2002), and the Banco de Portugal 
Conference on Labor Market Reform in Santa Maria Do Bouro (May 2003). The paper also 
greatly benefitted from many remarks and suggestions from seminar participants at places too 
numerous to list here. The customary disclaimer applies. 
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extension that we consider here, unemployed workers negotiate with a sin- 
gle employer in a conventional way, but when an employed worker receives 
an outside job offer, a three-player bargaining process is started between the 
worker, her/his initial employer, and the employer who made the outside offer. 
We explicitly model this bargaining process using a version of the Rubinstein 
(1982) infinite-horizon alternating-offers bargaining game. This allows us to 
relate workers' market power, i.e., the share of the match surplus that they 
obtain from the negotiation, to other structural search friction parameters. 
Related work includes Dey and Flinn (2003), who considered a rent-sharing 
model featuring the same wage-productivity relationship as in our paper, yet 
without providing a rigorous noncooperative game-theoretic foundation for 
that relationship.2 Mortensen (2003) developed a search-matching model with 
on-the-job search and examined a variety of ad hoc wage setting mechanisms, 
covering the whole spectrum from the monopoly union case through Nash bar- 
gaining, all the way to monopsony wage setting. Shimer (2005) studied wage 
bargaining in a simple economy with on-the-job search and compared the equi- 
librium wage distribution with the one predicted by Burdett and Mortensen 
(1998). He did not allow employers to counter outside offers and thus did not 
extend Rubinstein's setup to a three-player game. Last, Eckstein and Wolpin 
(1995) was the first paper to estimate a search-matching model, albeit without 
on-the-job search, on microdata. 
We estimate our structural model on a 1993-2000 panel of matched 
employer-employee French administrative data. These data contain firm-level 
information on value added, wages, and hours worked by labor category (based 
on occupation). One of the important empirical novelties of this paper is that 
we are able to use wage data on one side and productivity data on the other and 
see whether our wage equation correctly captures the link between the two. 
To our knowledge, this is the first estimation of an equilibrium search model 
that uses actual productivity data instead of predicting the distribution of pro- 
ductivity that best matches the distribution of wages. Our estimated model 
is found to correctly replicate the empirical wage-productivity relationship. 
In particular, we find that firm-level mean wages are below labor productivity, 
with a markup increasing from zero at low-productivity firms to about 100% at 
high-productivity firms. 
We estimate a very low bargaining power for "unskilled" workers (workers 
with no managerial tasks), between 0% and 20%, depending on the partic- 
ular industry considered, and a somewhat higher value for "skilled" workers 
(supervisors of all ranks and engineers), between 20% and 40%. Most exist- 
2Moreover, Dey and Flinn focus on the issue of renegotiation within a more complex frame- 
work with multidimensional employment contracts that stipulate wages and health insurance pro- 
visions. Due to this added complexity, they are unable to come up with a closed-form expression 
for wages and wage distributions. 
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ing studies find higher values for workers' bargaining power.3 If we end up 
estimating a much lower bargaining power coefficient than in the literature, 
although match productivity and worker wages follow the same definition, this 
is because our definition of the match rent is different. Allowing for on-the- 
job search and employers' counteroffers raises workers' outside options sig- 
nificantly. Now, using a more conventional definition of a match quasi-rent, 
namely, match output minus minimum wage, our model suggests the following 
decomposition of the share of the quasi-rent that goes to the worker into two 
components: first, the contribution of between-firm competition for labor ser- 
vices and, second, the outcome of the negotiation with the employer. Overall 
we find the former source of worker rent acquisition to be quantitatively much 
more important than the latter, in that if we shut down wage bargaining in 
our model, competition alone is still typically found to explain more than half 
(and up to 100% in the case of low-skill workers) of the workers' quasi-rent 
share. 
Our model thus offers an encompassing structural view of wage determina- 
tion. By explicitly accounting for on-the-job search, we leave ample scope for 
labor market competition to affect wages. By reducing the role of bargaining, 
we make wage determination less dependent on exogenous "black-box" para- 
meters such as preferences or bargaining power. This is important for under- 
standing the effect on wages of policy interventions. For example, our model 
suggests that sources of upward pressure on unskilled wages are mostly exter- 
nal to wage setting procedures and should rather be sought among parameters 
that affect the general competitive environment in which wages are determined 
(such as out-of-work income or payroll taxes). 
That labor market competition is found to matter a lot in wage determina- 
tion in France can sound somewhat surprising. First, the reputed "sclerosis" of 
the French labor market, where worker and firm unions negotiate wages at the 
industry level for all low- and medium-skill occupations, may have led to the 
presumption that negotiation should play a major role in determining wages in 
France.4 Second, high institutional wage floors in France possibly weaken the 
correlation between wages and productivity (especially for unskilled workers), 
and could potentially drive our finding that unskilled workers have very lit- 
3A far from exhaustive list of which includes Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Blanchflower, 
Oswald, and Sanfrey (1996), Van Reenen (1996), Margolis and Salvanes (2001), and Kramarz 
(2002). These studies are based on static models where some bargaining process leads to splitting 
the job surplus, typically defined as the difference between productivity and some outside wage 
that depends on worker characteristics and selected labor market variables such as the (local) 
unemployment rate and the industry- or economy-wide mean wage. 
4The high coverage rate of collective bargaining (about 95%) may indeed suggest that wages 
are primarily influenced by collective agreements. However, analyses of French wage data in the 
light of French wage setting institutions have shown that individual and match-specific hetero- 
geneity in productivity explain a remarkably high share of wage differentials (Goux and Maurin 
(1999), Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999)). 
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tle bargaining power. (The minimum wage covers about 15% of the employed 
work force in France.) However, the explicit incorporation of a minimum wage 
in our framework suggests that this is not the case: we find that low-skill labor 
categories do get a share of the job surplus over and above what would be 
implied by the sole presence of the minimum wage, and that this extra bit of 
worker rent can be attributed to between-firm competition. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we develop the theory. In 
Section 3, we use the theoretical model of Section 2 to estimate the influence 
of productivity, between-firm competition, and the bargaining power of work- 
ers on wages. In Section 4, we use our model to assess the relative quantitative 
importance of those wage determinants and conclude that labor market com- 
petition plays a primary part. Section 5 concludes. 
2. THEORY 
We first describe the characteristics and objectives of workers and firms. The 
matching process and the negotiation game that workers and firms play to de- 
termine wages is then explained. In the last subsection, the steady-state equi- 
librium of this labor market is characterized. 
2.1. Workers and Firms 
We consider a labor market in which a measure M of atomistic workers face 
a continuum of competitive firms, with a mass normalized to 1, that produce 
one unique multipurpose good. Time is continuous; workers and firms live for- 
ever. The market unemployment rate is denoted by u. The pool of unemployed 
workers is steadily replenished by layoffs that occur at the exogenous Poisson 
rate $. 
Workers have different skills. A given worker's ability is measured by the 
amount e of efficiency units of labor she/he supplies per unit time. The dis- 
tribution of ability in the population of workers is exogenous, with cumula- 
tive distribution function (cdf) H over the interval [Emin, Emax]. We consider 
only continuous ability distributions and designate the corresponding density 
by h. 
Summation of ability values over all employees in a given firm defines ef- 
ficient firm size. Firms differ in the technologies that they operate: marginal 
productivity of efficient labor (denoted as p) is firm-specific and is distributed 
across firms with a cdf F over the support [Pmin, Pmax]. This latter distribution 
is assumed continuous with density y. The marginal productivity of a match 
(e, p) between a worker with ability 8 and a firm with technology p is ep. 
A type-e unemployed worker receives an income flow of eb, with b a positive 
constant, which she/he has to forgo upon finding a job. Being unemployed is 
thus equivalent to working at a "virtual" firm with labor productivity equal 
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to b that would operate in a Walrasian labor market, therefore paying each 
employee their marginal productivity, eb.5 
Workers discount the future at an exogenous and constant rate p > 0 and 
seek to maximize the expected discounted sum of future utility flows. For sim- 
plicity, we assume that the instantaneous utility flow enjoyed from a flow of 
income x is U(x) = x. Firms maximize profits. 
2.2. Matching and Wage Bargaining 
Firms and workers are brought together pairwise through a sequential, ran- 
dom, and time-consuming search process. Specifically, unemployed workers 
sample job offers sequentially at Poisson rate A0. Employees may also search 
for a better job while employed and the arrival rate of offers to on-the-job 
searchers is A1. We treat A1 as an exogenous parameter.6 
The type p of the firm from which a given offer originates is assumed to be 
randomly selected from [pmin, Pma, according to a sampling distribution with 
cdf F (and F _ 1 - F) and density f. The sampling distribution is the same for 
all workers irrespective of their ability or employment status. When a match is 
formed, the wage contract is negotiated between the different parties following 
a set of rules that we now explain. 
Wages are bargained over by workers and employers in a complete informa- 
tion context. In particular, all agents who are brought to interact by the random 
matching process are perfectly aware of one another's types. All wage and job 
offers are also perfectly observed and verifiable. Wage contracts stipulate a 
fixed wage that can be renegotiated by mutual agreement only: renegotiations 
thus occur only if one party can credibly threaten the other to leave the match 
for good if the latter refuses to renegotiate. There are no renegotiation costs. 
Bargaining with unemployed workers 
When an unemployed worker meets a firm, the wage is determined as the 
outcome of a Rubinstein (1982) infinite-horizon game of alternating offers, 
the precise structure and solution of which are characterized in Section A. This 
5We assume that the flow opportunity cost of employment is proportional to individual ability 
essentially because this is the most tractable form. As is explained in Postel-Vinay and Robin 
(2002) and as will become clear from the analysis below, the substantive consequence of this 
(admittedly disputable) assumption is to rule out sorting: first, the distribution of ability is the 
same in the population of employees as in the population as a whole, second, it is independent of 
the employer's type. 
6Endogenizing Al at the macro level using a matching function ia la Diamond-Mortensen- 
Pissarides, as in Mortensen (2000), is not attractive given the paper's main objective. Endogeniz- 
ing A1 at a more micro level by allowing for endogenous worker search effort, as in Christensen, 
Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann, and Werwatz (2005), may be of greater importance for our pur- 
poses. We leave this extension to further research because Christensen et al.'s paper shows that 
this is by no means trivial. 
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game delivers the generalized Nash-bargaining solution, where the worker re- 
ceives a constant share / of the match rent. This latter parameter /3 is referred 
to as the worker's bargaining power. 
Formally, let Vo(e) denote the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker of 
type e and let V(e, w, p) denote that of the same worker when employed at 
a firm of type p and paid a wage w. When the worker is paid her/his mar- 
ginal productivity ep, the employer makes zero marginal profit on this worker, 
who therefore receives the entire match value V(e, ep, p). Further assuming 
that a vacant job has zero value to the employer, the difference between the 
match value V(e, ep, p) and the unemployment value defines the match sur- 
plus: V(e, ep, p) - Vo(e). The bargained wage on a match between a type-e 
unemployed worker and a type-p firm, denoted as 4•(e, p), solves 
(1) V(e, 40(E, P), P) = Vo(e) + P[V(e, ep, p) - Vo(E)]. 
This equation merely states that a type-e unemployed worker matched with 
a type-p firm obtains her/his reservation utility, Vo(e), plus a share / of the 
match surplus. 
Bargaining with employed workers 
When an employed worker contacts an outside firm, the situation becomes 
more favorable to the worker because she/he can now force the incumbent 
and poaching employers to compete.7 A formal presentation of the relevant 
strategic bargaining game is given in Section A; here we use a simple heuristic 
argument to derive the sharing rule. 
Let there be a worker of ability e and two would-be employers of produc- 
tivity levels p and p' > p. Competition between the two employers over the 
worker's services can be seen as an auction where the bidder with the higher 
valuation wins and pays the second price. Whereas obviously no employer will 
pay more than match productivity, the type-p' firm eventually hires the worker. 
Moreover, the auction forces firm p to place a bid equal to marginal produc- 
tivity Ep, which the worker values at V(e, ep, p). Accepting this contract is 
7Whenever the worker receives an outside offer, the preexisting contract with the incumbent 
employer prevails if no agreement is reached. This is an important difference with the negoti- 
ation on new matches-between unemployed workers and firms-that are dissolved in case of 
disagreement. We view this assumption as more in accordance with actual labor market institu- 
tions than the usual one according to which matches always break up in case of renegotiation 
failure (Pissarides (2000), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)). It is indeed legally considered in 
most OECD countries, and especially in France, that an offer to modify the terms of a contract 
does not constitute a repudiation. Accordingly, a rejection of the offer by either party leaves the 
preexisting terms in place, which means that the job continues under those terms if the renegotia- 
tion fails (Malcomson (1999, p. 2321)). This also suggests that the assumption of renegotiation by 
mutual agreement captures an important and often neglected feature of employment contracts 
(again, see the enlightening survey by Malcomson (1999)). 
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always an option for the worker and constitutes the new fallback position for 
the standard negotiation game that the worker and firm p' subsequently play. 
The outcome of this game is the wage 4(eP, p, p') in firm p' that leaves the 
worker with a value of V(e, sp, p)-her/his outside option-plus a share P or 
the match surplus V(e, Ep', p') - V(e, ep, p), i.e., 4(e, p, p') solves the equa- 
tion 
(2) V(8E, C(e, p, p'), p') 
= 1V(e, ep, p) + [PV(e, sp', p') - V(e, sp, p)], p' > p. 
Of course, renegotiation takes place only if it is in the worker's interest. As- 
sume that the worker is currently employed at firm p with wage w and that 
she/he is contacted by firm p'. If p' > p, then the workers moves to firm p' 
for a wage 0 (e, p, p') that is necessarily acceptable because it has more value 
than the highest wage firm p can offer, i.e., marginal productivity ep. If p' < p, 
however, then the worker decides to trigger the renegotiation game only if 
4 (e, p', p) > w. It is shown in Section B that the 0 (e, p, p') solution to (2) is 
increasing in E and p (but not necessarily in p'; see below). So, there exists a 
threshold q(e, w, p) (formally defined by 0 (e, q, p) = w) such that: 
(i) If p' < q(e, w, p), then the worker keeps the current wage contract w 
in firm p. 
(ii) If p > p' > q(e, w, p), the worker obtains a wage raise 40(e, p', p) - 
w > 0 from her/his current employer. 
(iii) If p' > p, the worker moves to firm p' for a wage 0 (e, p, p'). 
Note that whenever p' > p, the wage )(es, p, p') obtained in the new firm 
can be smaller than the wage w paid in the previous job, because the worker 
expects larger wage rises in firms with higher productivity. This option value 
effect implies that workers may be willing to take wage cuts just to move from 
a low- to a high-productivity firm. 
Finally, because the workers' bargaining power/3 is a focal point of this pa- 
per, we definitely need to explain where it comes from. The kind of alternating- 
offer infinite-horizon bargaining games ia la Rubinstein that we are invoking 
as a foundation for our wage equations (1) and (2) predict that the bargaining 
power potentially depends on other structural parameters, namely the discount 
rates of each party and their response time (i.e., the amount of time it takes 
for each party to formulate an offer), and also on the flow probability of match 
breakup during the bargaining rounds (see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)). In 
our framework this implies that P potentially depends on the discount rate (p), 
on the arrival rate of job offers (A0o or A,), on the time it takes for each party to 
formulate an offer at each negotiation round (i.e., the players' response times), 
and, finally, on the breakdown rate of the ongoing negotiation. However, we 
show in Section A that as this breakdown rate becomes large compared to the 
transition rates and the players' discount rates, the bargaining power is reduced 
to a function of the parties' relative response times only. Specifically, /3 is an 
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increasing function of the workers' ability to formulate offers quickly (relative 
to the employer) and is otherwise independent of the arrival rate of job offers 
or any other structural parameter. So p can indeed be considered as a sepa- 
rate structural parameter that specifically reflects the workers' ability to voice 
claims during bilateral negotiations with employers. 
2.3. The Wage Equation 
The precise form of wages can be obtained from the expressions of lifetime 
utilities (see Section B for the corresponding algebra). The wage 0 (e, p', p) 
of a type-e worker, currently working at a type-p firm and whose last job offer 
emanated from a type-p' firm, is defined by 
(3) (ep, p', p)=- 
IP- - )P ++hF(x) dx , p'< p. 
yJ ' p+58+A/PF(x) 
This expression shows that the returns to on-the-job search depend on the bar- 
gaining power parameter /. It can be seen that outside offers cause wage in- 
creases within the firm only if employers have some bargaining power. In the 
limiting case where P = 1, the worker appropriates all the surplus up front 
and gets a wage equal to ep, whether or not she/he searches on the job. In 
the opposite extreme case, where 3 = 0, the wage increases as outside offers 
come because all offers from firms of type p' E (q(e, w, p), p] cause within- 
firm wage raises. 
The wage q40(e, p), obtained by a type-e unemployed worker when matched 
with a type-p firm, is written as 
(4) 40(8, p) 8 - 
.Pinf 
- 
(1 -) 
-) 
- 
l( dx jPnf p + 8 + A1/3F(x) 
= 6(e, Pinf, P), 
where pinf is the lowest viable marginal productivity of labor. The latter is de- 
fined as the productivity value that is just sufficient to compensate an unem- 
ployed worker for her/his forgone value of unemployment, given that she/he 
would be paid her/his marginal productivity, thus leaving the firm with zero 
profits. Analytically, 
(5) V(e, EPinf, Pinf) = Vo(e) 
IPmax F(x) 
Pinf = b +P6(Ao - A) 
__ 
dx. 
' 
Pinf p + A hlPF(x) 
It is worth noting that the lower support of observed marginal productivity lev- 
els, which we denote by pmin, can be strictly above the lower support of vi- 
able productivity levels pinf, for instance, if free entry is not guaranteed on the 
search market. 
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The definition (4) of 4o0(e, p) together with the definition (5) of pif shows 
that entry wages received by individuals who exit from unemployment are not 
necessarily higher than unemployment income. It actually appears that those 
wages are always smaller than unemployment income if workers have no bar- 
gaining power, because accepting a job is a means to obtain future wage raises. 
Entry wages obviously increase with the bargaining power parameter 3. 
We conclude this section by commenting on comparative statics. The wage 
function 4~ (e, p, p') decreases with A, and F (in the sense of first-order sto- 
chastic ordering) and increases with 8. These properties reflect an option value 
effect: workers are willing to pay today for higher future earnings prospects. 
Of course 40(e, p, p') increases with the bargaining power, P. It also increases 
with worker ability e and the type p of the less competitive employer, because 
both Bertrand competition and Nash bargaining work in tandem to push wages 
up. However, we note an ambiguous effect of the type p' of the employer win- 
ning the auction: 4(e(, p, p') decreases with p' if p is small enough for the 
option value effect to dominate. A high p' means that the upper bound put on 
future renegotiated wages is more remote (because it is equal to p') and the 
worker is thus willing to trade lower present wages for a promise of higher fu- 
ture wages. However, 4 (e, p, p') increases with p' if / is large enough for the 
bargaining power effect on rent-sharing to take over the option value effect. 
2.4. Steady-State Equilibrium 
We know from the preceding discussion that a type-e employee of a type-p 
firm is currently paid a wage w that either is equal to 4•0(e, p) = 4(8e, Pinf, P) if w is the first wage after unemployment or is equal to 0 (E, q, p), with 
Pinf 
_< 
Pmin < q < , if the last wage mobility is the outcome of a bargain 
between the worker, the incumbent employer, and another firm of type q. 
The cross-sectional distribution of wages, therefore, has three components: 
a worker fixed effect (E), an employer fixed effect (p), and a random effect 
(q) that characterizes the most recent wage mobility. In this section we deter- 
mine the joint distribution of these three components. 
In a steady state a fraction u of workers are unemployed and a den- 
sity ?(e, p) of type-e workers are employed at type-p firms. Let ?(p) = 
f8mxn"" (E, p) de be the density of employees working at type-p firms. The aver- 
age size of a firm of type p is then equal to Me(p)/y(p). We designate the cor- 
responding cdf's with capital letters L(e, p) and L(p), and we let G(wle, p) 
represent the cdf of the (not absolutely continuous, as we shall see) conditional 
distribution of wages within the set of workers of ability e within type-p firms. 
The steady-state assumption implies that inflows must balance outflows for 
all stocks of workers defined by a status (unemployed or employed), a per- 
sonal type e, a wage w, and an employer type p. The relevant flow-balance 
equations are spelled out in Section C. They lead to the following series of 
definitions/results: 
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* Unemployment rate: This rate is defined as 
(6) u = ? 5 + Ao 
* Distribution of firm types across employed workers: The fraction of workers 
employed at a firm with marginal productivity of labor (mpl) less than p is 
F(p) (7) L(p)= (p) 
1+ K1F(P) 
with Ki = A1/6, and the density of workers in firms of type p follows from 
differentiation as 
(8) f(p) = 1Kj f (p). [1 + K?F(p)]2 
* Distribution ofmatches: The density of matches (e, p) is 
(9) f(e, p) = h(e)e(p). 
* Within-firm distribution of wages: The fraction of employees with ability e in 
firms with mpl p is 
1+ K1F(p) 2 + KL[q(E, w, p)] 2 (10) G(wjE, p)- 1 + K1F[q(e, w, p)] 1 + KiL(p) ) 
where q(e, w, p), defined in (A.9), stands for the threshold value of the 
productivity of new matches above which a type-e employee with a current 
wage w can get a wage increase. 
Equation (6) is standard in equilibrium search models (see Burdett and 
Mortensen (1998)) and merely relates the unemployment rate to unemploy- 
ment in- and outflows. Equation (7) is a particularly important empirical re- 
lationship because it will allow us separate the sampling distribution F from 
its empirical counterpart L.8 Equation (9) implies that, under the model's as- 
sumptions, the within-firm distribution of individual heterogeneity is indepen- 
dent of firm types. Nothing thus prevents the formation of highly dissimilar 
pairs (low e, high p or low p, high e) if both the firm and the worker profit. 
This results from the assumptions of constant returns to worker ability e, both 
in and out of employment, scalar heterogeneity, and undirected search. 
8It is exactly the same equilibrium relationship as between the distribution of wage offers and 
the distribution of earnings in the Burdett and Mortensen model. 
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3. ESTIMATION 
The estimation of the structural model goes through the following simple 
steps. Firm-level labor productivity identifies firm type p. We use worker data 
on jobs and employment durations to draw inference on the job offer arrival 
rate A, and the job destruction rate 8. The empirical distribution of firm-level 
labor productivity among workers identifies the distribution of firm types p 
across employees, L(p). The intercept and slope parameters of the regres- 
sions of log wages on log productivity by occupation and industry identify mean 
worker ability e and the bargaining power /3. 
We describe the data before explaining the estimation procedure in greater 
detail. Then, we discuss the results. 
3.1. Data 
We use a matched employer-employee panel of French data collected by 
the French National Statistical Institute (INSEE) and covering the period 
1993-2000. This panel contains standard accounting information extracted 
from the BRN (Brndfices R6els Normnaux) firm data source: total compensa- 
tion costs, value added, current operating surplus, gross productive assets, etc. 
The BRN data are supposedly exhaustive for all private companies (not estab- 
lishments) with a sales turnover of more than 3.5 million francs (about 530,000 
Euros) and liable for corporate taxes. 9 In addition, we use the DADS (D&c- 
larations Annuelles de Donnies Sociales) worker data source to compute labor 
costs and employment at the company level for various worker (skill) cate- 
gories. The DADS data are based on mandatory employer (establishments) 
reports of the earnings of each salaried employee in the private sector subject 
to French payroll taxes over a given year. This is a very large data set, which we 
"collapse" by firm and worker category, and then merge with the BRN data set 
to obtain our base sample.10 
Our base sample thus essentially contains firm-level data on value added, 
capital, and employment and labor costs by labor category over the period 
1993-2000. Regarding labor categories, we have sorted workers into the fol- 
lowing four distinct cells, based on occupation1: 
* Category 1: Executives, managers, and engineers. 
* Category 2: Technicians, foremen, and supervisors of all kinds. 
* Category 3: Clerical employees and skilled production workers. 
9The BRN is a subset of a larger firm sample, the BIC (Bendfices Industriels et Commerciaux). 
loFor more information on these data sets, we refer to Cr6pon and Desplatz (2001), who were 
the first to construct a similar matched panel covering the period 1993-1997. See also Abowd, 
Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) for another very precise description of the same and other data 
sources. 
"Apart from age, gender, and place of birth, occupation is the only personal characteristic that 
is available in our worker panel. 
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Category 4: Sales workers, unskilled production workers, and service em- 
ployees. 
In the sequel, we shall refer to "workers of observed skill level s," for 
s = 1, ..., 4, where our prior is that a worker's observed "skill level" (loosely 
defined though this latter term may be) is a decreasing function of the worker's 
category index s. 
Given this classification of workers, we then split our base panel into four 
panels of firm data on value added, employment, and average labor costs by 
skill category, covering the period 1993-2000 and corresponding to four dis- 
tinct industries: manufacturing, construction, trade, and services. Finally, these 
four panels were balanced and firms with strictly less than 10 employees in total 
were removed. This final trimming leaves us with four 7-year panels, involving 
an approximate total of just under 3 million workers distributed into 50,000 
firms each year. 
Table I contains some descriptive statistics for selected variables. From that 
table, we see that our four industries are somewhat different in size (as mea- 
sured by the total number of either firms or workers) and in the structure of 
their work force. In this latter respect, the construction sector stands out in 
that it seems to employ an especially large share of medium-skilled production 
workers (s = 3) and very few of the extreme categories (s = 1 or 4) within rel- 
atively small firms. In spite of these differences, the skill category s = 3 is by 
a substantial amount the most numerous-and therefore presumably the most 
heterogeneous-in all four industries. A last feature of Table I that may be 
worth mentioning at this point is that the numbers in parentheses in the right- 
most column denote the mean wages of labor categories 1, 2, and 3 relative to 
category 4. We see that the wage hierarchy follows our prior about the ranking 
of the observed skill levels. There are interindustry differences in those wage 
ratios: the construction sector once more is remarkable in that it is the sector 
where cross-occupational wage inequality is most important. 
Finally, estimating the model requires data on worker mobility. We use the 
French Labor Force Survey (Enquite Emploi; hereafter, LFS), which is a 3-year 
rotating panel of individual professional trajectories similar to the American 
Current Population Survey. We prefer to use the LFS panel instead of the 
larger DADS panel because the latter is known to be affected by large attri- 
tion biases. Moreover, the LFS is precisely designed to study unemployment 
and worker mobility. 
3.2. Productivity 
The production data (the BRN firm accounting data) are a set of NT obser- 
vations of value added (Y,,), the book value of capital (Kj,), and the number of 
working hours (divided by 2,028 = 52 x 39) of skill category s = 1, ..., 4 used 
by firm j in year t (Mg,), where j = 1,..., N is the firm index and t = 1,..., T 
is the time index. 
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TABLE I 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Total No. of Mean Mean Mean Share of Mean Annual 
No. of Labor Workers Firm Annual Output Labor Cost Labor Costa 
Industry Firms Category (% of Total) Size per Workera in Output (Ratio to Category 4) 
Manufacturing 17,804 1 130,346 (9.3%) 7.3 49.4 60.2% 68.0 (3.17) 
2 251,771 (18.0%) 14.1 36.5 (1.70) 
3 651,237 (46.4%) 36.6 25.6 (1.19) 
4 369,013 (26.3%) 20.7 21.5 - 
Total 1,402,367 79 
Construction 6,975 1 13,590 (5.7%) 1.9 41.4 65.1% 70.1 (3.46) 
2 32,620 (13.8%) 4.7 38.9 (1.92) 
3 162,818 (68.8%) 24.5 25.7 (1.27) 
4 27,474 (11.6%) 3.9 20.3 - 
Total 236,502 34 
Trade 13,011 1 49,360 (9.6%) 3.8 48.5 59.4% 65.5 (3.09) 
2 108,463 (21.0%) 8.3 33.7 (1.59) 
3 191,447 (37.1%) 14.7 23.5 (1.11) 
4 166,370 (32.3%) 12.8 21.2 
Total 515,640 40 
Services 12,191 1 113,401 (14.6%) 9.3 54.6 65.6% 62.3 (3.04) 
2 144,977 (18.6%) 11.9 33.6 (1.64) 
3 327,583 (42.1%) 26.9 24.3 (1.19) 
4 191,760 (24.7%) 15.7 20.5 - 
Total 777,721 64 
aOutput is value added measured in 1,000 Euros. 
0 
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We assume, as in the theory laid out in the preceding section, that the distri- 
bution of abilities in the sth skill category within each firm fluctuates around 
some fixed density, say hs(8). Assuming further that workers are perfectly sub- 
stitutable between skill categories as well as within, we define the total amount 
of efficient labor employed at firm j at time t as 
4 
(11) Lit=L asMsjt,, 
s=l 
where as f ehs(e) de is the steady-state mean ability in category s. 
We then specify firm j's total per-period output (value added) as the 
constant-return Cobb-Douglas function of capital and efficient labor 
(12) Yj, = KjKjL6 exp(7i,), 
where 0j is a firm-specific productivity parameter and rjt is a zero-mean 
stationary productivity shock independent of the fixed effect 0j. Elasticities 
? and X are between 0 and 1, and are common to all firms within a given in- 
dustry. We normalize a4 to 1 and leave 0j free. 
Using the panel of firm data on value added, employment, and capital, we 
estimate (13) in log form by iterated generalized method of moments (GMM) 
using lagged first-differences of the production function gradient as instru- 
ments,12 i.e., 
,A In4 
aMStT , , 
A i 
,t- 
s 1,=2,3 , 
Aln(L s tM)t {( T 
A In Kj,_I, 7 > 3, 
where we set a' equal to cross-category mean wage ratios. The estimates are 
thus consistent if r-j, is MA(2).'3 Confidence intervals are obtained by boos- 
trapping (with the necessary recentering for bootstrap to work in the case of 
overidentification).14 
Results 
Estimates of X, 
s, 
and a = (acI, a2, a3, a4), are displayed in Table II. These 
bring about two comments. First, it turns out that in spite of the large num- 
t2The model being nonlinear, it is well known since Chamberlain (1992) that the optimal vector 
of instruments is equal to the conditional expectation of the gradient of the production function 
(with respect to the parameters) given all instruments. 
'"We use instruments lagged three times based on the Sargan overidentification test. The Sar- 
gan test statistic drops sharply between r > 2 and r > 3 in all industries except the puzzling case 
of construction. Three is also the minimum number of lags for which the p-value is nonzero at 
computer precision in all industries. 
14See Freedman (1984), Hall and Horowitz (1996), and Horowitz (1998). 
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TABLE II 
PRODUCTION FUNCTION GMM ESTIMATES 
Bootstrap Distribution (Percentile) 
Industry Parameter Estimate Mean 25th 50th 97.5th 
Manufacturing cat 2.92 2.85 2.20 2.83 3.68 
a2 1.79 1.72 1.23 1.70 2.26 
a3 1.18 1.17 0.97 1.16 1.42 
a4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.92 0.91 0.85 0.91 0.97 
x 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.14 
Construction a1 2.03 2.05 1.11 2.02 3.30 
a2 1.84 1.86 1.29 1.81 2.70 
a3 1.26 1.23 0.93 1.21 1.67 
a4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
s 
0.97 0.96 0.86 0.96 1.05 
X 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.11 
Trade al 2.90 2.96 2.36 2.95 3.66 
a2 1.47 1.49 1.19 1.49 1.83 
a3 1.37 1.39 1.22 1.39 1.60 
a4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.96 0.95 0.89 0.95 1.02 
X 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.10 
Services at 2.72 2.73 2.35 2.72 3.15 
a2 1.42 1.46 1.12 1.45 1.84 
a3 0.89 0.90 0.75 0.90 1.06 
a4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.94 0.94 0.92 0.94 0.97 
X 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.09 
ber of firms that we have in our sample, the precision of the production func- 
tion parameter estimates obtained by direct GMM estimation is poor. This 
will induce us to design an alternative estimation procedure for that set of pa- 
rameters and to check our results' robustness (see Section 3.4). Second, the 
estimated returns to capital are very low (between 0.04 and 0.08, depending 
on the industry and estimator considered). Zero returns to capital cannot even 
be rejected in construction or trade. Conversely, the estimated returns to la- 
bor are high (between 0.91 and 0.96; 1 is often included in the confidence 
interval). As a result, the constancy of returns to scale is rejected in none of 
our four sectors and we can thus apply the theory laid out in the previous 
section. 
Assuming that firm j's capital stock continuously adjusts to equate the mar- 
ginal productivity of capital to its user cost r, so that rKjt = (1 - 4) Y1t for 
all (j, t), and replacing Kj, with its optimal value in (12), one easily obtains the 
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expression for firm j's mean labor product, 
(13) 
p_ Yj, 
= 1- 0j 
exp(rjt)1, (13) jt 
r 
and, although our theory does not allow for productivity shocks, we neverthe- 
less define In pj = E(ln pit) as the expectation of In pj, with respect to transi- 
tory shocks nlit." 
3.3. Worker Mobility 
In this section we are interested in the distribution of job spell durations, us- 
ing a sample drawn from the French Labor Force Survey data. Whereas all job 
transition processes are Poisson, all corresponding durations are exponentially 
distributed. The distribution of job spell durations t has, conditional on p, the 
density 
(14) ?(tlp) = [8 + AF(p)] 
. 
e-[+A'F(p)l' 
where we know from (8) that p is distributed in the population of employed 
workers according to the density e(p) 
- 
(1 + Kl)f(p)/[1 + KIF(p) 2. 
Because it is impossible to match the LFS worker data with the BRN firm 
data (which is the only source of information on p), we treat p as unob- 
served heterogeneity and integrate it out from the joint likelihood of p and t, 
fe(p)L?(tlp). To obtain estimates of 8 and K1, we thus maximize the uncon- ditional likelihood of job spell durations, L(t) = fPmax• (p)?(tlp) dp, which turns out to have the simple enough expression 
(15) ?(t) = [EI(8t) - EI(6t(1 + K1))], K1 
where El (t) = f,I(e-x/x) dx is the exponential integral function.16 Note in par- 
ticular that L(t) depends only on parameters 8 and A1. Integrating unobserved 
'"The rent that is shared between the entrepreneur j and one single type-s worker with ability 
value e should be this worker's marginal contribution to firm j's output net of capital costs. From 
the assumptions spelled out earlier in this paragraph, the latter is Yj, - rKj, = Y), = pjt,Lj,. 
Hence, given (13), bargaining takes place over the marginal rent 
d[ Y, - rK,] jt. 
d[hs(e)Ms,] 
The marginal productivity of the match thus multiplicatively depends on the worker's ability e 
and the firm's mean labor product Pit. 
"6See Abramowitz and Stegun (1972). The exact likelihood that we maximize does take into 
account the fact that the panel covers a fixed number of periods so that some job durations are 
censored. However, it is straightforward to apply this integration methodology to likelihoods over 
both uncensored and censored spells. The algebra is just a bit more tedious. 
This content downloaded from 193.54.67.93 on Mon, 15 Dec 2014 05:33:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WAGE BARGAINING WITH ON-THE-JOB SEARCH 339 
productivity p out of the conditional likelihood L(tlp) not only takes out p, 
but also removes all reference to the sampling distribution F, irrespective of 
its exact, unknown shape. 
This method of unconditional inference was first explored by Van den Berg 
and Ridder (2003). It is robust to any modeling error in the way wages are 
negotiated. The only property of the theoretical model that is used is that there 
exists a scalar firm index p-we do not need to define it precisely-such that 
a worker employed at a firm p moves to a firm p' if and only if p' > p. Then 
stationarity implies that the steady-state distribution of p is e(p). The source 
of identification in the unconditional inference approach is state dependence: 
unobserved heterogeneity makes the hazard rate a decreasing function of job 
spell duration, the slope of which identifies A1.17 
Results 
The unconditional maximum likelihood estimates of 8, A,, and, most impor- 
tantly, K1 are reported in Table III. In terms of K1 (i.e., the average number of 
outside contacts that an employed worker can expect before the next unem- 
ployment period), higher skill categories tend to be more mobile than lower 
skilled ones (with the remarkable exception of the construction sector, where 
category 1 turns out to have the lowest value of K1). Now looking at the fre- 
quency of such contacts, which is measured by A,, we find a similar pattern, 
in which workers with higher observed skill levels tend to get more frequent 
outside offers than less skilled workers. Finally, the rate of job termination 8 is 
everywhere a decreasing function of the skill index s (except again for construc- 
tion, where categories 1, 2, and 3 exhibit values of 8 that are roughly equal). 
The average duration of an employment spell (i.e., the average duration be- 
tween two unemployment spells), 1/8, ranges from 10 to 35 years, while the 
average waiting time between two outside offers, 1/A•, lies between 3.5 and 
19 years. The average number of outside contacts, K1, that results from these 
estimates is never very large (between 1 and 6.4), which confirms the relatively 
low degree of worker mobility in the French labor market. Workers are rela- 
tively less mobile in manufacturing than elsewhere, where they tend to have 
both lower job separation and lower job-switching rates. 
These values are in the same order of magnitude as those found by ear- 
lier studies using different data sets (see, for instance, Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, 
and Robin (2006), where the source is the European Community Household 
Panel). To get a sense of how reasonable they are, one can compute the average 
length of a job spell implied by the model. Straightforward algebra shows that 
this average is defined by fo t?(t) dt = [1/8 + 1/(8 + ,A•)]. Taking the largest 
'7For a graphical illustration of this state dependence, see Jolivet, Postel-Vinay, and Robin 
(2006). 
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TABLE III 
TRANSITION PARAMETER ESTIMATESa 
Parameter 
Labor 
Industry Category Al 1/Al 8 1/6 K1 = A1/ 
Manufacturing 1 0.130 7.72 0.033 30.50 3.95 
(0.031) (1.82) (0.004) (3.70) (1.20) 
2 0.067 15.00 0.029 34.84 2.32 
(0.011) (2.55) (0.003) (3.15) (0.49) 
3 0.066 15.25 0.039 25.81 1.69 
(0.006) (1.50) (0.002) (1.32) (0.20) 
4 0.053 18.79 0.052 19.10 1.02 
(0.007) (2.63) (0.004) (1.28) (0.17) 
Construction 1 0.125 8.00 0.059 17.06 2.13 
(0.050) (3.19) (0.012) (3.56) (1.05) 
2 0.175 5.71 0.055 18.25 3.19 
(0.050) (1.65) (0.008) (2.70) (1.16) 
3 0.174 5.76 0.055 18.34 3.18 
(0.023) (0.77) (0.004) (1.25) (0.54) 
4 0.254 3.94 0.102 9.78 2.49 
(0.06) (0.93) (0.012) (1.13) (0.72) 
Trade 1 0.190 5.28 0.044 22.56 4.27 
(0.163) (4.54) (0.019) (9.58) (2.18) 
2 0.286 3.50 0.045 22.24 6.36 
(0.220) (2.69) (0.014) (6.82) (3.30) 
3 0.113 8.88 0.053 19.01 2.14 
(0.011) (0.90) (0.003) (1.00) (0.27) 
4 0.102 9.80 0.075 13.34 1.36 
(0.025) (2.43) (0.009) (1.65) (0.40) 
Services 1 0.214 4.68 0.038 26.63 5.69 
(0.041) (0.90) (0.003) (2.42) (1.40) 
2 0.119 8.44 0.044 22.82 2.71 
(0.019) (1.33) (0.004) (1.88) (0.54) 
3 0.191 5.24 0.055 18.30 3.49 
(0.02) (0.43) (0.002) (0.75) (0.36) 
4 0.321 3.12 0.098 10.25 3.29 
(0.05) (0.53) (0.008) (0.80) (0.69) 
aEstimates are per annum. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
worker category as an example (clerical employees and skilled manual work- 
ers), we find the values 8.1, 6.9, 6.4, and 7.1 years for manufacturing, construc- 
tion, trade, and services, respectively. Our estimated values of 8 and A1 thus 
yield reasonable predictions of mean employment duration and can be consid- 
ered to be adequate calibrations for the upcoming counterfactual analysis. 
We end this section with a short discussion of the effect of a low contact 
rate Al on wage dynamics. The arrival of job offers to employees clearly mat- 
ters in determining the frequency of wage increases within a job spell, i.e., the 
This content downloaded from 193.54.67.93 on Mon, 15 Dec 2014 05:33:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WAGE BARGAINING WITH ON-THE-JOB SEARCH 341 
returns to seniority: a straightforward prediction of our model is that lower 
values of A1 are associated with lower average returns to seniority. However, 
we have used no data on wage dynamics to identify and estimate the contact 
rate. We still have to ask whether the estimated value of A1 is consistent with 
the returns to seniority in France. 
There is little work on wage dynamics within and between firms for France, 
in sharp contrast with the abundant, yet polemical, literature on the returns 
to seniority and experience in the United States. The recent contribution by 
Beffy, Buchinsky, Fougere, Kamionka, and Kramarz (2005) fills this gap. They 
estimated a joint model of participation, mobility, and wages for France, al- 
lowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity and state dependence. Their 
results suggest that returns to seniority are small in France, even close to zero 
for some education groups. In a companion study using the same specification, 
Buchinsky, Fougere, Kramarz, and Tchernis (2002) had found much larger re- 
turns to seniority in the United States. Beffy et al. also found a similar discrep- 
ancy when they use the model of Altonji and Williams (1998). They attributed 
the bulk of that discrepancy to interfirm mobility: in fact, they specifically ana- 
lyzed their empirical findings through the lens of a job search model (Burdett 
and Coles (2003)) closely related to the one we use in this paper and they 
showed that the France-United States gap in returns to tenure is explained by 
differences in firm-worker contact rates (i.e., Al) within a model where the re- 
turns on seniority are the consequence of labor market competition caused by 
employed job search. 
3.4. The Wage Equation 
Consider again a market segment that consists of workers all in the same 
skill category. For each firm j in the sample and each period t, we compute the 
average wage of labor category s, say wii, or wy,, omitting the s index for no- 
tational simplicity. Under the steady-state assumption and using the theory of 
wage determination and equilibrium wage distributions presented in Section 2, 
wij, exhibits stationary fluctuations around the steady-state mean wage paid by 
firm j, with mean labor productivity pp. Using the steady-state distributions 
derived in Section 2.4, Section D establishes that 
(16) E(itjipj) 
[1+ K1L(pj)]2 
Pmin 1 
K(1 - -) + (1 - 
T 
I)K1L(q) 
where a = Ee is the mean efficiency of workers in that market, o- = •, and 
L(.) is the steady-state distribution of employers' productivity across employ- 
ees in that market. 
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The previous estimation steps yield consistent and fairly precise estimates 
of K1 and , but very imprecise estimates of parameter a. For that reason we 
estimate 3, 4, and a simultaneously (the normalization a4 = 1 allows identifi- 
cation of ) by iterating the following estimation procedure, for starting values 
o0, ao = (aoo, o, a, o, a =1): 
1. Estimate pj as 
pj(ao) = exp[ - In 4 ot 
and estimate the steady-state distribution L, of workers of skill category 
s = 1,...,4 at firms of any productivity p by the empirical distribution of 'P, 
weighting each firm in the sample by the average amount of type-s labor in that 
firm over the T observation periods (M, = C, Ms,,): 
L(p; >j 
1 11{(a0) 
_<p N 
2. Estimate 6al, ..., 6a4 =  and P3, ..., /4 by applying nonlinear least 
squares to the system of four seemingly unrelated regressions: for s = 1, ..., 4, 
In 
-w-l, 
= ln(6as) + In 'j(ao) - 
1-+ [1+ KiL (P'; a0)]2 
X [1+ Kl(1 - 0) + uK1Ls(q; ao)] 
J min{pj(ac0) 
x [1 + K1Ls(q; a0)]2 
x [1 +3pK1(1 - O') 
+ (1 - p + P3o)KLs(q; a0)]-1 dq] + us,, 
j 
-1, ..., N , 
t 
- 
= 
, ..., T, 
imposing the normalization a4 = 1 and where 
uj, 
= (u,, , u4jt) is a vector 
of transitory shocks due to worker inflows and outflows of unrestricted vari- 
ance. (We set the discount factor p to an annual value of 5% for everyone, 
i.e., eP = 0.95.) 
We use the GMM estimates of the production function to initiate the proce- 
dure. 
Results 
The estimation results are gathered in Table IV. The numbers in parenthe- 
ses are the bootstrap standard errors based on 1,000 replications of our entire 
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TABLE IV 
WAGE EQUATION ESTIMATESa 
Bargaining Power Productivity 
Industry 1 132 33 134 al a2 a3 a4 
Manufacturing 0.35 0.13 0.00 0.00 2.54 1.51 1.16 1.00 0.96 
(0.042) (0.072) (0.013) (0.000) (0.070) (0.067) (0.016) (-) (0.009) 
Construction 0.98 0.26 0.15 0.17 2.87 1.79 1.24 1.00 0.88 
(0.051) (0.040) (0.024) (0.058) (0.088) (0.058) (0.038) (-) (0.008) 
Trade 0.38 0.33 0.14 0.00 2.47 1.28 1.00 1.00 0.88 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.062) (0.018) (0.046) (0.028) (0.040) (-) (0.010) 
Services 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.00 2.57 1.55 1.07 1.00 0.97 
(0.040) (0.028) (0.047) (0.000) (0.067) (0.036) (0.033) (-) (0.010) 
aThe discount rate eP = 0.95. Bootstrap standard errors are given in parentheses. 
estimation procedure, i.e., including the estimation of the transition parameters, 
on 1,000 resamples with replacement. Thus, the reported standard errors do 
account for the presence of nuisance parameters K1 and L, and for the fact 
that mean productivity f' depends on the production function parameters as. 
We note that despite the number of nuisance parameters, those estimators are 
remarkably precise. 
The first four columns of Table IV display the bargaining power estimates 
and the last five columns display the estimates of the production function pa- 
rameters. Bargaining power is found to be an increasing function of observable 
ability, the least skilled two categories being endowed with a bargaining power 
close to 0. There are some small discrepancies across sectors, but the most 
striking one is the bargaining power of the first category of workers (managers) 
in the construction sector: it is close to 1, whereas it is never higher than 1/3 
in all other sectors. Also, bargaining power seems to be uniformly low for all 
labor categories in the service sector. 
Looking at estimates of relative productivity, we find that the less skilled 
categories 3 and 4 have values of as very close to (yet slightly lower than) the 
wage ratios displayed in Table I. This is not the case for the higher skill cat- 
egories 1 and 2, where the ability ratios a, are estimated substantially lower 
than the corresponding wage ratios. Productivity differences thus only account 
for a fraction of interoccupational wage differentials. Other nonproductive fac- 
tors have to be appealed to so as to explain cross-occupation wage inequality. 
The construction sector is again remarkable in this respect, because this is the 
sector where interoccupational wage dispersion is highest. Productivity differ- 
ences across labor categories also seem larger here than in other sectors, but 
the productivity ratio of managers in the construction sector is still not large 
enough to explain the relative wage of that category of workers. 
To show how well (16) fits the data, we have plotted in Figure 1 the predicted 
and observed (log) mean wages against (log) firm productivity levels In Fij for 
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our four industries. Each column pertains to one given industry and each row 
pertains to a given skill level. The solid curves represent the log wages pre- 
dicted by the structural model. The dashed curves are nonparametric regres- 
sions of log wages on log labor productivity, with which the model's prediction 
should be compared. The gray dots correspond to the scatterplot. Finally, the 
solid lines represent the log of match productivity, ln(6aspj). 
A glance at the various panels of Figure 1 shows that the model is reasonably 
good at predicting wages. More specifically, the figure suggests two remarkable 
stylized facts. One is that the wage paid by the lowest p firms in our four sam- 
ples and for all categories of workers is always very close to match productivity 
(solid line) at pmin. The other is that profit rates are strongly increasing with 
productivity: the gap between wages and productivity-which as we just saw is 
close to zero at pmin--becomes substantial at higher values of p. Our structural 
model correctly captures this phenomenon. 
Going back to our bargaining power estimates, one final point is worth men- 
tioning. The point estimates gathered in Table IV were obtained with a pa- 
rameterization that constrains 3 to stay within the unit interval. One can thus 
worry that the model would, in fact, best fit the data with negative values of 0, at 
least in the cases where the constrained estimates reach the zero lower bound. 
Estimating P without imposing the constraint/3 P [0, 1] yields unconstrained 
estimates p3 that are significantly negative in two cases only: labor category 4 
in manufacturing (P, = -0.12, standard error = 0.023) and labor category 4 
in services (/3 = -0.12, standard error = 0.046).18 In both cases, the negative 
point estimates are small in absolute value. In addition, most importantly, the 
set of other parameters that are estimated jointly with those negative /3's-the 
/3's for other labor categories in the same industry and the production func- tion parameters for this industry-turn out to be only marginally affected by 
the constraint p/3 [0, 1]. Overall, we conclude that forcing/3 E [0, 1], while 
needed to make economic sense, imposes only a very mild constraint on the 
model. The negative estimated values reflect only the poor estimation of L,(p) 
in the lowest tail of the distribution of firm labor productivity. 
Last, the production function parameters 6, al, a2, and a3 in Table IV, esti- 
mated using the wage equation (16), are well within the 95% confidence inter- 
val obtained by bootstrapping the GMM estimation of the production function. 
Estimating a from value added or from wages yields close estimates. We view 
this result as strongly supportive of the theory. 
3.5. A Robustness Check: Legal Minimum Wage Omission Biases 
So far no mention has been made of an institutionalized wage floor: both 
our theoretical model and our estimation procedure also ignore the presence 
IsWe also find very slightly negative, nonsignificant point estimates 3,, for category 4 in trade 
and category 3 in manufacturing. 
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of a minimum wage, yet the minimum wage is binding for approximately 15% 
of the employed work force in France. This observation begs the question of 
the extent to which our results depend on this omission.19 The problem is that 
introducing a legal minimum wage in the theoretical model complicates the 
model structure by an order of magnitude. However, the critique is a serious 
one: intuitively, a binding minimum wage should lower the correlation between 
wage and productivity. Because, as we explained before, our main source of 
identification for the bargaining power coefficient P is the slope of the wage- 
productivity relationship, our finding of 3 = 0 for low-skill workers might thus 
be largely driven by the fact that we ignored the presence of a binding minimum 
wage. 
Part of the difficulty in introducing a minimum wage-say, wmin-into the 
theoretical model is that with heterogeneous workers and firms, a wage floor 
generates negative sorting: only matches with productivity such that pe > Wmin 
are viable. However, assuming homogeneous worker ability e, sorting is no 
longer an issue and it becomes possible-however cumbersome-to adapt the 
estimation procedure to the new theoretical equations.20 The supplemental 
material available on the journal's website (Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin 
(2006)) describes how the theory is modified by the incorporation of a mini- 
mum wage, describes how to change the estimation procedure accordingly, and 
shows the new results. Overall, we find that the minimum wage is not binding 
enough to substantially change our results. 
3.6. Distributions 
Figure 2 plots the densities y(p), fs(p), and f,(p) for all categories of work- 
ers in all four industries. The overall shape is log-normal-like. The sampling 
distribution fs(p) is more concentrated than the distribution of productivity 
pj across firms, which is itself more concentrated than the distribution of em- 
ployer productivity levels across workers, es(p). A clear stochastic dominance 
pattern appears: f,(.) is systematically to the left of y(.), which is in turn first- 
order stochastically dominated-although to a lesser extent-by f (.). 
4. THE ROLE OF BETWEEN-FIRM COMPETITION IN WAGE DETERMINATION 
In this section, we use our framework to disentangle the respective influence 
of the bargaining power and between-firm competition on wage determination 
within each sector. 
1"We thank the co-editor in charge of this paper for raising this issue. 
20Note that Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) found very little evidence of heterogeneous ability 
among observationally low-skill worker categories. Because minimum wages are most likely to 
be binding for these low-skill categories, we feel confident that this restriction to homogeneous 
workers is not a strong limitation on the validity of the results. 
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4.1. Measuring the Contribution of Between-Firm Competition 
to Worker Market Power 
As we argued in the Introduction, the conventional approach to evaluating 
workers' bargaining power ignores job-to-job mobility, which amounts to shut- 
ting down between-firm competition for employed workers. Our model offers 
a simple way to assess the bias in the estimation of P that results from this 
simplification. It is this bias that we now examine. 
Ignoring job-to-job mobility amounts to forcing K1 = 0 in the wage equa- 
tion (16) that now reads 
(17) E(wlp, KI = 0) = /oa3 p + (1 - 1o)aCPmin, 
where 0o denotes the value of p that corresponds to this counterfactual exper- 
iment. Thus, forbidding on-the-job search, the rent-sharing equation takes the 
most standard form and the bargaining power thus simply measures the mean 
worker share of match rent aS6p - c•Spmin: 
Ew - 
a6Pmin (18) 13o =
acEp - agpmin 
The rent-sharing coefficient 3o is a simple measure of worker market power. 
We obtain an estimator po of po by replacing Ew and Ep in (18) by their em- 
pirical analogs. 
The values of po are gathered in the second column of Table V. For ease 
of comparison, the first column of Table V reiterates the estimates of P ob- 
tained from the full model with on-the-job search, 13, that were already shown 
in Table IV. 
Comparing estimates with and without on-the-job search-i.e., comparing 
the first two columns of Table V-immediately shows that the bargaining 
power is always overestimated when one ignores job-to-job mobility. The mag- 
nitude of this upward bias varies across skill groups and sectors, but the bias 
always seems to be there and always is important. This was expected because 
on-the-job search is a means by which an employee can force his/her employer 
to renegotiate his/her wage upward. Neglecting on-the-job search, the work- 
ers' bargaining power increases to make it fit the actual share of compensation 
costs in value added. 
In the last column of Table V, we compute a rough measure of the contribu- 
tion of between-firm competition to worker market power po as (8o - 1)/lPo. 
We find that between-firm competition is by far the most important source 
of market power for unskilled workers. Concerning high-skilled workers, be- 
tween 40% and 60% of the amount of rent they are able to capture is due to 
their bargaining power. The fact that low-skill workers have, at the same time, 
a low bargaining power and still are the category of workers with the lowest 
arrival rate of alternative offers A1 could seem to be a contradiction. However, 
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TABLE V 
MEAN WORKER SHARE OF MATCH RENTSa 
Estimated 
Bargaining Power Observed Worker 0-0 
Labor with OTJ Search Share of Rent: 
Industry Category ((3 from Table III) 30 (%) 
Manufacturing 1 0.35 0.62 44 
2 0.13 0.34 62 
3 0.00 0.20 100 
4 0.00 0.15 100 
Construction 1 0.98 0.95 3 
2 0.26 0.37 30 
3 0.15 0.43 65 
4 0.17 0.31 45 
Trade 1 0.38 0.66 42 
2 0.33 0.61 46 
3 0.14 0.35 60 
4 0.00 0.20 100 
Services 1 0.16 0.46 65 
2 0.00 0.14 100 
3 0.08 0.32 75 
4 0.00 0.09 100 
aThe discount rate eP = 0.95. 
a low contact rate may simply reflect a low demand for unskilled labor, lead- 
ing to a scarcity of vacancies for low-skill jobs. Last, an important component 
of the bargaining power is the capacity to voice claims during the negotiation 
process. This capacity may be greater for more educated workers. 
4.2. Counterfactual Evaluation of the Effect of On-the-Job Search 
on Rent Sharing 
We estimate the average waiting time between two outside offers to lie be- 
tween 3.5 and 19 years. Outside offers are thus rather rare events. This low 
value of the (employed) worker-firm contact rate may seem at odds with our 
finding that interfirm competition explains most of the workers' rent share. To 
resolve this apparent inconsistency, we should begin by emphasizing that, from 
our cross-section steady-state perspective, what matters in the determination 
of the workers' rent share is not how many firms workers can get to compete 
for their services per unit time (which is what the contact rate AI measures), but 
rather the number of firms a worker can bring into competition per employ- 
ment spell, i.e., before that worker's surplus is reset to zero by the occurrence 
of a layoff. This latter number is precisely K1 = A 1/, which is the correct mea- 
sure of competitive intensity in our model labor market. In other words, again 
from our cross-section perspective, measuring competitive intensity requires a 
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"rescaling of time" in terms of the average length of an employment spell, 1/8: 
labor markets with very low firm-worker contact rates may thus still appear 
to be very "competitive" from this point of view if they are also characterized 
by a long average duration of uninterrupted employment. Moreover, we shall 
now see that it takes only very little between-firm competition measured in this 
particular way-i.e., it takes only small values of the parameter Kl-to provide 
the workers with a large share of the match rent. 
This concept is illustrated in Figure 3, which is constructed as follows: First, 
we simulate artificial wages using our wage equation and our estimates as pa- 
rameter values, with the exception that we force p to equal 0 and K1 to cover 
the interval [0, 15]. That is, we simulate the wages that workers would re- 
ceive if they had zero bargaining power in various competitive environments 
ranging from K1 =0 (job-to-job mobility is ruled out, implying no between- 
employer competition) to Kj = 15 (job-to-job mobility is very easy, imply- 
ing fierce between-employer competition). We then compute workers' market 
power, 3o, that corresponds to each value of K1 within our range. Figure 3 plots 
this share against K1, for all skill categories and industries. 
We see in Figure 3 that the dependence on K1 of the workers' rent share 
is upward sloping and highly concave: while the workers' rent share increases 
very steeply-from 0 to a typical 20-25%-as K, rises from 0 to a value of about 
2 or 3, it increases only by a few extra percentage points as one takes K, to 
values as unrealistically high as 15. This finding implies that relatively modest 
values of K1 are enough to guarantee a large share of the match rent for the 
workers. In other words, it takes only a little between-firm competition to raise 
the workers' wages by a substantial amount. 
A candidate explanation of this phenomenon goes as follows. When a worker 
finds his/her first job, he/she is initially unemployed. At that point the negoti- 
ation outcome is favorable to the employer because the worker's only outside 
option is to remain unemployed. The first outside offer raised by the new em- 
ployee is of great (expected) value because it allows him/her to renegotiate 
his/her wage under much more favorable circumstances. The second outside 
offer is already less valuable (still in expected terms), because the worker's 
wage was already raised due to the first offer and it is therefore less likely that 
the second offer will get the worker a substantial additional wage increase. 
As new outside offers come along, the worker's situation improves and the 
expected gain from the next outside offer declines (especially if the distribu- 
tion of firm productivity levels is not very dispersed). Generally speaking, the 
returns to on-the-job search are expected to be rapidly declining with the num- 
ber of outside offers raised since the beginning of the job spell. At this point we 
should insist once again on the fact that all this is compatible with very low val- 
ues of the firm-worker contact rate A,, as long as layoffs are sufficiently rare 
events, i.e., as long as spells of continuous employment are on average long 
enough to leave time for employed workers to raise a few outside job offers. 
Figure 3 also brings about a final comment. The solid vertical lines on the 
four panels indicate the values of K1 we estimated from the LFS data and 
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the dotted vertical lines locate the 95% bootstrap confidence interval around 
the estimated value (see Table III). We see that these values are typically at 
the very beginning of the "flat region" of the KI - workers' rent-share rela- 
tionship. A way to express this result is to say that encouraging between-firm 
competition on the French labor market would likely not have a large impact 
on wages. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper is the first attempt to estimate the influence of productivity, bar- 
gaining power, and between-firm competition on wages in a unified framework. 
We use an original equilibrium job search model with on-the-job search and 
wage bargaining as a theoretical structure, which we bring to the data. The 
combined use of a panel of matched employer-employee data and of LFS data 
allows us to implement a multistage estimation procedure that yields separate 
estimates of the search friction parameters (job destruction rates, arrival rates 
of job offers) and labor productivity at the firm level. These estimated values 
of the friction parameters and firm productivity levels are then used to esti- 
mate the bargaining power that appears in the wage equation delivered by the 
theoretical model. 
Our main finding is that between-firm competition plays a prominent role 
in wage determination in France over the period 1993-2000. The bargaining 
power of workers turns out to be very low-typically between 0 and 1/3-in 
all industries, up to a few exceptions among high-skilled workers. However, we 
definitely find that skilled workers have bargaining power, albeit less than is 
usually estimated, and are thus able to capture a substantial share of the job 
surplus for reasons that cannot be entirely explained by the competition for 
labor services between employers. This is an interesting result that calls for 
further research to enable a better understanding of what lies inside the black 
box of the bargaining power parameter P/3. The game-theoretic model featured 
in this paper interprets this parameter in terms of different response times for 
workers and firms, and different time discount rates. However, we have very 
little empirical evidence on the dependence of these variables on such intuitive 
candidate determinants as education or trade union density, for example. 
Our results also rely on simplifying assumptions that would need further 
scrutiny. We now list three very desirable extensions. 
One set of extensions would improve the capacity of the model to describe 
individual wage dynamics. First, the current version of the model lacks produc- 
tivity shocks. This is absolutely not a trivial extension because it implies dealing 
with the problem of when and why wage contracts are renegotiated following 
productivity shocks. However, it would yield much richer and more realistic 
wage dynamics, would endogenize layoffs, and would potentially explain why 
wages change more when there is an employer change than otherwise. A sec- 
ond desirable extension is to allow for experience accumulation. This is also 
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not a trivial extension, because even if the experience accumulation process is 
exogenous, the contracts that firms and workers would now negotiate are no 
longer single wages, but are full experience-wage profiles (see Carrillo-Tudela 
(2005)). 
A second extension goes in the direction of endogenizing matching para- 
meters to make them a function of worker search effort and firm vacancy- 
posting behavior. There we need to model labor demand and make the model 
a full general-equilibrium search-matching model 'a la Pissarides. This is an- 
other nontrivial extension.21 Mortensen (2000) already bridged the gap be- 
tween equilibrium search models and search-matching models. We need to 
follow him in that direction. 
The last extension that we have in mind relates to the very strong assump- 
tions that we have made about the value of nonlabor time (eb) and about the 
absence of heterogeneity in the search-matching parameters. If one makes job 
offer arrival rates worker-specific or if one changes the form of the flow value 
of nonlabor time, then one loses the property that there is no sorting in equi- 
librium. For example, if good-quality workers receive alternative offers more 
often, then they will climb the wage and productivity ladder faster, and positive 
sorting results. Solving such an equilibrium search model with sorting and es- 
timating it is surely very difficult, but nevertheless constitutes a very promising 
area for future research. 
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APPENDIX: DETAILS OF SOME THEORETICAL RESULTS 
A. Wage Bargaining 
This appendix contains the details of the two negotiation games that under- 
lie the wage equations used throughout the paper. Both games are based on 
Rubinstein's (1982) alternating offers game. 
21Note in passing that it is precisely because the model that we develop here is still a partial 
equilibrium one that we do not move on to policy analysis. Any interesting policy reform (e.g., 
a change in payroll taxes or in unemployment insurance benefits) not only affects wages, but also 
affects labor demand, which is currently mostly exogenous. 
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A.1. Bargaining with unemployed workers 
The negotiation game between a type-e unemployed worker and a type-p 
employer is as follows. The worker and the employer make alternating offers. 
When one of the players offers a contract (a wage), the other player either 
accepts or rejects the offer. If the offer is accepted, then the bargaining ends 
and the offered contract is implemented. If the offer is rejected, then the game 
goes on to a next round after a short time delay, denoted by Ae if the worker 
just rejected an offer by the firm or by Af if the firm just rejected an offer by 
the worker. In the next round, the player who last rejected an offer makes a 
counteroffer, which again can be either accepted or rejected. The game goes 
on in this way over an infinite horizon. It is also assumed that the match is 
destroyed at Poisson rate s and that the worker can receive wage offers from 
outside firms at rate A during the negotiation game. The discount rates of the 
worker and the firm are denoted by p and pf, respectively. 
PROPOSITION 1: The outcome of the negotiation game described above is a 
wage 40o(e, p) that solves 
(A.1) V(e, 40o(e, p), p) = PfV(e, , p) + (1 - P)Vo(e) 
when Ae -- 0, and Af 
--+ , q -+ +oo, with p = Af/(A, + A,). 
PROOF: The proof is little more than an application of a result by Osborne 
and Rubinstein (1990, p. 87). Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) showed that the 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the negotiation game is a pair of stationary 
strategies in which the firm (worker) offers the wage Wf (we) that makes the 
other party indifferent between accepting the wage offer instantaneously or 
waiting his/her turn to make a counteroffer. More formally, assuming that 
Ae and A4 are "small" intervals of time, (wf, We) solves 
V(e, Wf, p) = [be?, + (1 - sAd - AAh)V((e, wi, p) 1 + pAe 
+ sAeVo(e) + AAeV(8, Wf, p)], 
where V(e, wf, p) is the value to the worker if she/he accepts the firm's of- 
fer wf and the right-hand side is the value if she/he refuses. Similarly, 
1 
H(, We, w, p) = [rroAf + (1 - sAf - AAf)H((e, wf, p) 1+ pfdf 
+ sAfHo + AAfFI(e, we, P)], 
where 11(e, We, p) is the firm's profit if it accepts the worker's wage offer wi, 
and V(e, w, p) and 1H(e, w, p) denote the worker's and the firm's (finite) con- 
tinuation values of the game that is started should the worker receive an out- 
side offer from another firm, and where it has been assumed that the firm's 
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flow payoff from a vacant job slot is 70 and that the present discounted value 
of such a vacant job is H0. 
These last two equations can be rewritten as 
(A.2) V(e, wf, p) - V(., We, p) 
= 
-Ae[(S + A)V(e, We, p) + pV(E, wf, P) 
- be - sVo(E) + AV(8, Wf, P)], 
(A.3) H(E, we, p) - H(E, wf, p) 
= 
-Af[(s + A)!H(E, Wf, p) + pfIH(, we, p) 
- ITO - sHo + AI(e, We, P)]. 
Both equations imply that wf - we when Af -+ 0 and Ae -+ 0. Denoting the 
common limit of wf and we by w, one can write 
dV( V(E, Wf, p) - V(e, we, p) (E,w,p)= lim 
H Hi (, Wf, p) - H(e, we, p) (e, w, p) = lim SW Af,Ae-+0 Wf - We 
Using these last two equations and taking the ratio between (A.2) and (A.3) 
for Af, Ae -- 0, we obtain 
dV(E8,WP) ( )W )be+sV0 (s)+AV(e, w, p) (A.4) V ( , p) A(p + s) V(e, w, p)- b+s+A 
(E, w, p) Af(pf + s) I( Ap)F- (o+8no+te,w,p) 
d)w ) pf+s+A 
Assuming that the firm's valuation of a vacant job slot is 0, that is, ro = Ho = 0 
(as would result from free entry and exit into the search market), we can define 
the surplus of an (e, p) match as S(E, p) = H (8, w, p) + V(8, w, p) - Vo(s).22 
This implies, together with the identity H(s, ep, p) = 0, that H(e, w, p) = 
V(e, sp, p) - V(e, w, p) for all w. Thus, 
,(8 
w p) - ?(, ww,p) for all w. 
Therefore, the wage solution to equation (A.4), denoted by 00o(, p), also 
22Shimer (2005) considered a bargaining game in all respects similar to this one, except that 
incumbent employers cannot match outside offers. The current wage then determines the dura- 
tion of the match and the bargaining outcome therefore does not satisfy a "surplus splitting" rule. 
If employers can counter outside offers, mobility is determined by match productivity, not by the 
wage, and the surplus is then the sum of the firm's profit and the worker's net value. 
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solves 
(A.5) V(e, 40o(E, p), p) 
= pV(e, ep, p) 
be + sVo(e) + AV(e, 4)o(, P), P) - (,(,p),+ 
+(1-/3) p+s+A 
where 
Af(pf + s + A) (A.6) =/3 df(Pf + s + A) + Ae(p + s + A) 
As s -+ oc, (A.5) confounds itself with our definition (A.1) of 4o0(e, p), while 
the bargaining power /3 - Af/(Ae + Af). This completes the proof of the 
proposition. Q.E.D. 
Our interpretation is that the bargaining power P does not depend on the 
discount factor, on the destruction rate of operating jobs, or on the arrival rate 
of job offers if these three parameters are small enough compared to the job 
destruction rate during the negotiation process.23 
A.2. Renegotiation 
When an employed worker contacts an outside firm, she/he has the oppor- 
tunity to renegotiate her/his wage according to the following game: 
1. The firms make simultaneous noncooperative wage offers. 
2. The worker either chooses one wage offer and signs a new contract or 
keeps the preexisting contract. 
3. If the worker has chosen one wage offer at step 2, some time elapses. 
Then the worker can initiate a renegotiation with the firm whose offer was 
refused at stage 2. This renegotiation obeys the same rules as the negotiation 
game between unemployed workers and firms, except now the outside option 
is not unemployment, but the job and wage contract accepted at step 2. 
The negotiation game that is played between two firms and an initially em- 
ployed worker resembles the game between a firm and an unemployed worker 
except that the former has three players instead of two. Two steps have been 
added to enable the worker to maneuver so as to build him/herself an opti- 
mal credible threat point in the renegotiation subgame (step 3). Namely, if the 
worker accepts the offer of the poaching firm at step 2, she/he quits the in- 
cumbent firm and this offer becomes her/his threat point in the renegotiation. 
23Note that assuming pf - p (firms and workers use the same discount rate) also implies that 
/3 depends only on the players' response times. What is different from (1) in this case is the 
worker's threat point, as it appears in (A.5). 
This content downloaded from 193.54.67.93 on Mon, 15 Dec 2014 05:33:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WAGE BARGAINING WITH ON-THE-JOB SEARCH 357 
Conversely, her/his threat point is the offer of the incumbent employer if that 
offer is accepted at step 2. This game can appear to be somewhat unrealistic 
at first glance, because it gives the employee the option to momentarily quit 
her/his initial employer to eventually return with a new contract at the end of 
the renegotiation. Such back-and-forth worker movements do not happen in 
the real world; neither do they happen in our game, as we wish to emphasize, 
because temporarily quitting to a less attractive employer is available for the 
worker to use only as a threat, which is never implemented in equilibrium. 
PROPOSITION 2: The renegotiation game has the following outcomes when 
a type-e employee paid a wage w in a type-p firm receives an outside offer from 
a type-p' firm. 
* If p' < p, the worker stays at the type-p firm with a new wage c (e, p', p) de- 
fined by 
(A.7) V(e, 0(e, p', p), p) = V(e, ep', p') + P[V(e, ep, p) - V(e, ep', p')] 
if h (e, p', p) > w or stays at the type- p firm with the wage w otherwise. 
* If p' > p, the worker moves to the type-p' job, where she/he gets a wage 
4(e, p, p') that solves 
(A.8) V(e, o(e, p, p'), p') = V(e, ep, p) + [V(e, ep', p') - V(e, ep, p)]. 
PROOF: The renegotiation game is solved by backward induction. Let us 
denote by w' and wl the wage offers made at step 1 by firm p' and p, respec- 
tively. We assume that if the worker receives two offers that yield the same 
value, she/he chooses to stay with the incumbent employer. 
At step 3, the renegotiation follows the same rules as the negotiation be- 
tween unemployed workers and firms-only with different outside options and 
possibly different values of the parameters, notably the arrival rate of outside 
job offers A. Therefore, the worker who accepted a wage offer wl at step 2 and 
renegotiates with firm p' at step 3 ends up with a wage w that solves 
V(e, w, p') 
= PfV(e, Ep', p') 
be + sV(e, w1, p) + AV(e, w, p') - P AJ(o("Ep),p) 1-0 pf+S?A 
+ (1 - p) 
p+s+A 
where p/3 is defined as in (A.6). As s - +oo, this becomes 
V(e, w, p') = fV(e, sp', p') + (1 - P)V(e, W1, p) 
This content downloaded from 193.54.67.93 on Mon, 15 Dec 2014 05:33:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
358 P. CAHUC, E POSTEL-VINAY, AND J.-M. ROBIN 
with / = Af/(AO + Af). Similarly, the worker who accepted a wage offers 
w• 
at 
step 2 and renegotiates with firm p at step 3 gets a wage w that, when s -> +oo, 
solves 
V(e, w, p) = p V(e, p, p) + (1 - P)V(e, w, p'). 
These two bargaining solutions imply the following decision pattern for the 
worker: 
* If the worker has accepted w' at step 2, bargain and work with p if 
V(e, Ep, p) > V(C, w', p'); otherwise keep w'. 
* If the worker has accepted w1 at step 2, bargain and work with p' if 
V(e, sp', p') > V(e, w1, p); otherwise keep w1. 
At step 2, the worker accepts the wage offer that leaves him/her with the 
highest value. If she/he accepts w1, she/he knows that she/he will trigger a rene- 
gotiation at step 3 if and only if V(e, ep', p') > V(E, w1, p). Thus, the value of 
accepting w, at step 2 equals 
V = max[p/V(e, Ep', p') + (1 - P)V(E, w1, p), V(E, w1, p)]. 
Similarly, the value of accepting w' at step 2 equals 
V = max[p/V(e, ep, p) + (1 - P)V(e, wI, p'), V(e, wI, p')]. 
At step 1, employers make simultaneous offers. Both employers offer the 
lowest possible wage that attracts the worker while leaving them with nonneg- 
ative profits. 
If p' > p, employer p' must offer w' such that V(e, wI, p') > V(e, ep, p) so 
as to attract the worker at step 3 because the maximum wage that employer p 
can afford to offer is ep and yields a value of V(e, ep, p) to the worker. If 
the worker accepts w1 = ep, then at step 3 she/he will eventually end up being 
hired at firm p' for a wage 0 (e, p, p') that solves 
v(e, k(E, p, p'), p') = 3EV(e, p', p') + (1 - /3)(e, p, p). 
Firm p cannot bid this wage that exceeds ep. To avoid wasting time be- 
tween steps 2 and 3 of the bargaining game, firm p' immediately offers w' - 
S(e, p, p') at step 1, which the worker immediately accepts at step 2 without 
initiating a renegotiation at step 3. 
If p' < p, things are exactly symmetric: employer p must offer w1 such that 
V(e, wl, p) > V(E, Ep', p') so as to retain the worker at step 3, because the 
maximum wage that employer p' can afford to offer yields V(e, Ep', p') to the 
worker. If the worker accepts w7 = ep', then at step 3 she/he will eventually 
end up staying at firm p for a wage b(e, p', p) that solves 
V(e, 4(e, p, p), p)= 3V(e, Cp, p) + (1 - P)V(C, Ep', p'). 
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Firm p' cannot bid this wage that exceeds ep, and again to avoid wasting time 
in unnecessary negotiations, firm p offers 40(e, p', p) immediately and the 
worker accepts it immediately with the qualification that it has to improve on 
her/his previous situation (i.e., 4P(e, p', p) > w). If P(8s, p', p) < w, the worker 
keeps the previous contract with wage w and discards any offer from p'. 
This completes the characterization of the subgame perfect equilibrium of 
our bargaining game and the proof of the proposition. Q.E.D. 
A.3. Additional remarks about these bargaining ames 
It is worth introducing some extra notation at this point (for use in the main 
text): we see that the minimal value of p' for which something happens (i.e., 
either a wage increase or an employer change occurs) is q(e, w, p) such that 
(A.9) V(e, w, p) = P/V(e, ep, p) + (1 - P)V(e, eq(E, w, p), q(e, w, p)), 
which is equivalent to 04(e, q(e, w, p), q(e, w, p)) = w. 
We should also once more emphasize two main assumptions that underlie 
the two wage equations (1) and (2) that we use in the paper. The first (and most 
disputable) assumption is that the rate of job destruction s is high while work- 
ers and firms bargain. The second one is that we assume that 3 is equal across 
worker-firm pairs (in particular, unemployed workers are assumed to have the 
same bargaining power as "insiders"). According to the game-theoretic inter- 
pretation that we offer in this appendix, this is tantamount to assuming that 
response times (Ae and Af) are equal across all worker-firm pairs. 
B. Equilibrium Wage Determination 
Here we derive the precise closed form of equilibrium wages 4(0(E, p) and 
4(e, p, p') defined in (1) and (2), respectively. The first step is to derive the 
value functions Vo(-) and V(.). Whereas offers accrue to unemployed workers 
at rate A0, Vo(e) solves the Bellman equation 
(A.10) (p + Ao) Vo(E) = Eb + Ao 1V(E, 0o(e, X), X) dF(x), J Pinf 
where pinf is such that V(E, EPinf, Pinf) = Vo(E). Now turning to employed workers, consider a type-s worker employed at a 
type-p firm. Whereas layoffs occur at rates 8, we may now write the Bellman 
equation solved by the value function V(E, w, p): 
(A.11) [p + 8 + AlF(q(e, w, p))]V(e, w, p) 
= w + 8Vo(e) + A• V(e, (e, x, p), x) dF(x) 
1 q(e,w,p) 
+ Ai V(e, (e, p, x), x) dF(x). Jp/ 
a 
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Let us denote by pmax the upper support of p. Using the rent splitting rules 
established in Proposition 2 yields the equivalent expression 
(A.12) [p +5 + AfF(q(e, w, p))]JV(e, w, p) 
= w + 8Vo() 
p 
+ A1 [(1 - Pf)V(e, Ex, x) + p3V(e, ep, p)] dF(x) 
Pq(e, w, p) 
f Pmax 
+ A,1 [(1 - O)V(e, ep, p) + PV(e, ex, x)] dF(x). 
Imposing w- e= in (A.12), taking the derivative, and noticing that the defini- 
tion (A.9) of q(e, w, p) implies that q(e, ep, p) = p, one gets 
dV e (A.13) d(e, ep, p) = dp p + 8 + Af3F(p) 
Then, integrating by parts in equation (A.12), 
(A.14) (p + 6)V(e, w, p) 
w + 18Vo(e) + 3Alfe 
_ 
F() dx 
P p + 8 + A,6F-(x) SAP F(x) 
+ (1-/3)A F(x)e dx. 
q(,W,p) p + 8 + Ai3pF(x) 
Let w = 4(e, p', p) with p' < p. Straightforward algebra shows that 
(A.15) (e, p', p) 
P eF (x) 
= ep + (1 - f)ep' - (1 - P)2A1 ( dx. p' P +?AiJAF(x) 
The lower support of the distribution of marginal productivity levels, pm•,j cannot fall short of the value pinf such that V(e, epinf, Pinf) = Vo(e). Using the 
definitions (A.10) of Vo(e) and (A.14), of V(e, w, p), this identity yields 
(A.16) Pinf = b + (Ao - A) 
Pmax F(x) dx. 
Pinf P + 8 + A13F(x) 
(Note that the value of pinf is independent of e. This result holds true for any 
homogeneous specification of the utility function.) Finally, whereas the bar- 
gaining outcome implies (A.15), the identity V(e, EPinf, Pinf) = Vo(E) implies 
This content downloaded from 193.54.67.93 on Mon, 15 Dec 2014 05:33:06 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
WAGE BARGAINING WITH ON-THE-JOB SEARCH 361 
the alternative definition of 40(E, p): 
(A.17) ' po(e,p) 
= 4(e, Pinf, P) 
= ep + (1 - P)epinf - (1 - )2A1 F() dx. 
Pinf p + + AI PF(x) 
C. Equilibrium Wage Distributions 
The G(w1e, p)(e8, p)(1 - u)M workers of type e, employed at firms of 
type p, and paid less than w E [4o0(, p), 8p] leave this category either because 
they are laid off (rate 8) or because they receive an offer from a firm with mpl 
p > q(e, w, p) that grants them a wage increase or induces them to leave their 
current firm (rate AhF[q(e, w, p)]). On the inflow side, workers entering the 
category (ability e, wage < w, mpl p) come from two distinct sources. Either 
they are hired away from a firm less productive than q(e, w, p) or they come 
from unemployment. The steady-state equality between flows into and out of 
the stocks G(wle, p)f(e, p) thus takes the form 
(A.18) {8 + AzF[q(e, w, p)]}G(w1e, p)e(e, p)(1 - u)M 
= ouMh(e) + AI(1 - u)M f(e, x)dx f(p) 
Pmin 
= 8h(s) + A, f(e8, x) dx (1 - u)Mf(p), 
Pmin 
because A0u = 8(1 - u). Applying this identity for w = ep (which has the prop- 
erty that G(epes, p) = 1 and q(e, ep, p) = p), we get 
{8 + 
AiF(p)}e(e, p) 
= Sh(e) + A1 j (e, x) dx f(p), 
Pmin 
which solves as 
1+ K1 
e(8, p) = 1 + K ()f (p). [1+ KIF(p)]2 
This shows that ?(e, p) has the form h(e)e(p) (absence of sorting) and gives 
the expression of e(p); hence (8) and (9). Equation (8) can be integrated be- 
tween pmi,, and p to obtain (7). Substituting (7), (8), and (9) into (A.18) finally 
yields (10). 
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D. Derivation of E[T(w) Ip] forAny Function T(w) 
The lowest paid type-e worker in a type-p firm is one that has just been hired 
and, therefore, earns 00(E, P) = 4(E, Pinf, p), while the highest paid type-e 
worker in that firm earns his/her marginal productivity ep. Thus, the support 
of the within-firm earnings distribution of type-e workers for any type-p firm 
belongs to the interval [pint, p]. Noticing that G(qIp) = G(4(e, q, p)Ie, p) has 
a mass point at pinf and is otherwise continuous over the interval [pmin, p], we 
can readily show that for any integrable function T(w), 
(A.19) E[T(w)lp] 
1 f T(w)G(dwle, p) E.min ( , Pmin,P) 
+ 
T(co(e, p))G(4o(8, p)[e, 
p)j h(),de 
f 
Emax 
E m nT(Pp)h(E)de 
[1 + KF(p)2 femax 
+[1 K ] [T(0((, p))- T(2f(p, Pmin, p))]h(e)de [1 + K emin 
- [1 + K1F(p)]2 f f T'(0(e, q, p))eh(e) dr 
Pmin . min 
(1 - )[1 + (1 - o-)KIF(q)] 
x dq. [1 + (1 - Jo)Kl3F(q)][1 + KF(q)]2 
The entrants' wage 40(E, p) equals 4(e, pinf, p). This implies that (A.19) 
can be further simplified by noticing that if the lower support of viable produc- 
tivity levels pinf equals the lower support of observed productivity levels 
p•,•i (which amounts to assuming free entry and exit of firms on the search market), 
then the second term on the right-hand side vanishes, changing (A.19) to 
E[T(w)lp] 
- max 
- 
T(8p)h(e)de emin 
- [1+ K1F(p)]2 r'(4(e, q, p))eh(e) de 
(1 - /3)[1 + (1 - o-)KF(q)] x dq. [1+ (1 - o-)K1P3F(q)[l + K1F(q)]2 
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We maintain this assumption throughout the paper.24 Next, using (8) to substi- 
tute F(p) = (1 - L(p))/(1 + KiL(p)), we obtain 
(A.20) E[T(w)lp] 
= T(ep)h(e) de 
emin 
1-f3 
[1 + K1L(p)12 
fP f[J emax 
Tx ( (efq,p))eh(e) de 
Pmin 8min 
[1 + K1(1 - T) ? +K1L(q)][1 + K1L(q)]2 x dq. 1 + e3K1(1 - o) +(1 - 3+,o-)KL(q) 
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